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Recent studies of the effect of currency arrangements on goods market integration 
(starting with Rose, 2000) employ a methodology based on volumes of trade.  However, 
the connection between market integration and trade flows can be loose.  In this paper, 
we adopt a different methodology that uses a 3-dimensional panel of prices of 95 very 
disaggregated goods (e.g., light bulbs) in 83 cities around the world from 1990 to 2000.  
We find that the impact of an institutionalized stabilization of the exchange rate, i.e., a 
currency board or a currency union, generally provides a stimulus to goods market 
integration that goes far beyond reducing exchange rate volatility to zero.  However, 
there are important exceptions.  Among the institutional arrangements, long-term 
currency unions demonstrate greater integration than more recent currency boards.  All 
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1.  Introduction 
The consequences of exchange rate volatility, and more generally, currency 
arrangements, are at the heart of open economy macroeconomics yet professional opinion on 
their impact on goods market integration is divided.  Witness the debate (and accompanying 
fanfare) surrounding the launch of the single European currency.  Prominent among the 
skeptics, Feldstein (1997) argued that the euro would impose large costs upon its member 
countries without providing substantial economic benefits.  This conclusion is based partly on 
his reading of the empirical literature up to 1997 that generally reported a small effect of 
exchange rate stabilization on trade volumes.   
In contrast, a recent influential paper by Rose (2000), argues that adopting a common 
currency provides a substantial expansion of the volume of trade; an effect that goes beyond the 
impact of reducing exchange rate volatility to zero.  Indeed, Rose estimates that the presence of 
a common currency increases bilateral trade among members by as much as 300% over what 
would be expected between otherwise identical countries.  Frankel and Rose (2002), Engel and 
Rose (2001), Glick and Rose (2002), and Rose and van Wincoop (2001) have provided further 
extensions and support to this claim.  Building on results in Frankel and Romer (1999), Frankel 
and Rose (2002) have gone on to argue that having a common currency provides a substantial 
boost to the member countries’ output growth.  For example, they estimate that dollarization 
would raise an average country’s income by 4 percent over twenty years.  On the other hand, 
this line of research has also attracted criticism.  Persson (2001) and Tenreyro (2002) have 
suggested that the trade promotion effect of a common currency is greatly exaggerated due to 
the possibility of endogeneity of existing common currency areas, and Klein (2002) has argued 
that the basic results in Rose (2000) are not robust when the sample is restricted to certain sub-
samples.     2
Regardless of their ultimate conclusions, all existing studies share a common 
methodological approach: they gauge market integration using observed trade flows, and draw 
inferences from an estimated version of the gravity model.  This approach however, has its 
limitations; key among them is that the mapping between the volume of trade and the degree of 
market integration is not tight.  In general, the volume of trade depends not only on factors that 
gravity equations control for (size, distance, etc.), but also on the degree of substitutability of 
each country’s output.  Generally speaking, a given increase in trade barriers would generate a 
larger response in trade volumes if the degree of substitutability is higher.  To put the same 
message a different way, a particular pair of countries may trade more than another pair, even in 
the presence of greater barriers.  That is, the true degree of market integration can be lower, 
despite a higher volume of trade.
1   
Moreover, the degree of substitution and membership in a common currency can be 
correlated.  For example, certain European countries and their former colonies are more likely 
to share a common currency in the Rose (2000) sample than a random group of countries.  
However, former colonies and their colonizers are also likely to produce goods that have a 
relatively low degree of substitution with one another.  In this case, the estimated effect of 
currency arrangements on trade volume might be biased upward; thus giving a misleading 
picture of the true effect of currency arrangements. 
In this paper, we adopt a different approach that is based on observed deviations from the 
law of one price (DLOP).  This approach does not share the limitations of the volume-based 
approach.  Consonant with theory, changes in market integration will be reflected in prices 
whether trade occurs or not, since it is the potential for arbitrage that dictates how far apart 
                                                 
1 This point was recently illustrated by Wei (1996).   3
prices can diverge.  To measure integration between any two geographic markets, our new 
approach uses a theory-inspired metric based on the empirical distribution of the DLOPs for a 
large and identical set of tradable products (e.g., prices of frozen chicken, light bulbs, toilet 
paper and tonic water, all standardized by weight or volume).  The metric is motivated by an 
insight from Heckscher (1916), which states that the existence of positive arbitrage costs implies 
an inequality constraint between prices in two locations.  This insight has been formalized in the 
recent literature on non-linear deviations from the law of one price including Obstfeld and 
Taylor (1997), Taylor (2001), and O’Connell and Wei (2002).   
Our approach is facilitated by a unique cross-country data set on the prices of 95 very 
disaggregated goods among 69 countries in the world from 1990 to 2000 (inclusive).  These 69 
countries span every inhabited continent.  The data, from the Economist Intelligence Unit, is the 
most extensive set available in terms of the scope of country and goods coverage from a single 
source. Assimilation by a single source insures greater comparability of the goods across 
international locations.   
Two additional benefits can be derived from using this data set.  First, because the data 
set covers 1999 and 2000, we are able to offer an early assessment of the effect of the euro – 
which started as an accounting unit on January 1, 1999 – on goods market integration.  Second, 
we will use prices of the same set of goods in 14 U.S. cities to construct a benchmark of market 
integration, against which the effect of other currency arrangements can be compared. 
Other studies have examined law of one price deviations.  A partial list includes: 
Richardson (1978), Rogers and Jenkins (1995), Engel and Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (1996, 
2001), Crucini et al. (2001), Rogers (2001), and O’Connell and Wei (2002).   In particular, Engel 
and Rogers (1996) pioneered the metric for measuring market integration used in this paper.  
However, none of the papers has applied the methodology to study the impact of currency   4
arrangements on goods market integration.  With this new approach, we will show that some 
important findings in Rose (2000) can be confirmed while some others need to be qualified.  
We will also undertake some exercises that have not been done in this literature. 
As noted, we exploit both time series and cross-sectional variation available in the panel 
of local currency price data from the Economist Intelligence Unit.  In particular, we study all 
(unique) bilateral price comparisons the data allow.  These bilateral comparisons contain both 
intra- and inter-continental dimensions.  Thus, in this study, we go beyond previous studies 
using two country, or at most intra-continental, price comparisons only.  The payoff from 
having this extensive data set is an ability to study a wide variety of currency arrangements 
including currency unions (e.g. Euro and CFA) and currency boards (Hong Kong and 
Argentina) in a unified framework. 
In this study, we make a conceptual distinction between institutional versus instrumental 
stabilization of the exchange rate.  The former refers to reducing volatility through dollarization, 
adoption of a currency board, or via another common currency.  The latter refers to reducing 
volatility through intervention in the foreign exchange market or via monetary policies, i.e., any 
arrangement other than institutional stabilization.  Institutional stabilization implies a greater 
degree of commitment and a much lower probability of reversal in the future.  By removing one 
more layer of uncertainty, it is conceivable that an institutionalized stabilization can provide a 
greater stimulus to goods market integration than merely reducing exchange rate volatility to 
zero via an instrumental stabilization.  How big the extra stimulus is, must be determined by an 
empirical analysis. 
Our main findings can be briefly summarized.  First, reducing nominal exchange rate 
variability reduces the range of observed deviations from the law of one price.  Second, an 
economically stronger effect (by an order of magnitude) comes from a more institutionalized   5
arrangement – such as a currency union or a currency board.  Third, there is an important 
heterogeneity among different types of institutionalized currency arrangements.  For example, 
the goods market among the CFA countries is not very integrated according to our price-based 
metric – despite the presence of a currency union among these countries.  This suggests that a 
caveat is appropriate when making ‘average’ statements of the effect of a common currency on 
goods market integration.  Fourth, these basic results survive when we endogenize the 
formation of common currencies and currency boards, and when we estimate the results on 
sub-samples of the data.  Fifth, among all common currency arrangements, goods markets are 
most integrated in the United States.  Of course, the U.S. shares not only a common currency, 
but also a host of other market unifying conditions including a common legal and regulatory 
framework.  Thus, relative to the U.S. benchmark, European goods market integration still has 
further to go. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a description of the 
basic EIU data set in more detail, along with other data sources that we consult.  As the heart of 
our analysis, Section 3 has three parts: results from a benchmark regression; economic 
interpretation of the basic results; and finally, a sequence of extensions and robustness tests.  
Section 4 draws our conclusions. 
 
2.  Data and Basic Patterns 
Data 
The primary data set we employ contains standardized price comparisons for over 160 
goods and services for up to 122 cities compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit.  The data 
come from the Worldwide Cost of Living Survey, and are designed for use by human resource 
managers for compensation policies.  The data set is described in more detail at http://eiu.e-  6
numerate.com/asp/wcol_HelpWhatIsWCOL.asp.  For many goods in the data set there are 
two prices: one from a supermarket and one from a ‘high-priced outlet’.  Our focus in this study 
is on traded goods; and among traded goods we selected supermarket prices when there was a 
choice.   
Additionally, not all goods and cities are available in each time period.  Since we are 
interested in both cross-sectional and time series variation, we dropped goods and cities with 
‘large’ numbers of missing observations. We generally wanted all goods in the sample to be 
available for most cities in most years, hence we dropped goods with over 30% missing 
observations.  Finally, we kept only one city per country (with the exception of the United 
States, which we use as a separate benchmark).  The end result is a panel of 95 goods and 83 
cities.  Appendix Tables 1 and 2 list the goods and cities included.   
In addition to the price data, we use data on tariff rates, from Table 6.6 of the World 
Bank publication World Development Indicators available on the World Bank web site.  For each 
country, the tariff data are available for two years – once in the early 1990s and once for the late 
1990s.  We use the first reported value in our bilateral tariff rate calculations for the years 1990-
95.  Similarly, we use the most recent value for the years 1996-2000.  The precise variable 
definitions are discussed below.  For this study we selected the columns “simple mean tariff” 
and “weighted mean tariff” (page 336-39).  Additionally, we use monthly exchange rates and 
money supplies from the April 2001 IFS CD for all countries except Taiwan, where the data 
was taken from the CEIC data base provided by the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary 
Research.   
 
Some Examples of Percentage Price Differences 
Let  t k i P , ,  be the U.S. dollar price of good k in city i at time t.  For a given city pair (i,j)   7
and a given good k at a time t, we define the common currency percentage price difference as:  
t k j t k i t k ij P P Q , , , , , , ln ln − = . (1) 
As noted above, we study all bilateral price comparisons the data allow.  There are 3403 city 
pairs (=(83x82)/2) – each with 11 (annual) time periods.  Thus, for each of the 95 prices, the 
vector of price deviations will contain 37,433 (3403x11) observations without missing values.  
Since for any given city-pair or time period  t k ij Q , ,  may be positive or negative, we first focus on 
absolute percentage price deviations.  
As an illustration of the basic features of the data, Table 1 presents the percentage price 
dispersion (in absolute value) for two selected products among several city pairs.  We make no 
claim that these are representative.  They serve only to give a flavor of the data set and to 
presage some of the features we want to highlight. 
The city pair Asuncion and Taipei is the farthest apart in our sample.  The price 
difference for light bulbs and onions is also the biggest among the examples in Table 1 (though 
this need not be true for all the other products).  A key issue that we will examine more 
formally is whether a reduction in exchange rate volatility would lead to a reduction in the 
segmentation of the goods market.  Paris and Vienna have now belonged to a single currency 
union (euro) since the beginning of 1999.  Comparing the price difference between the two 
cities in the pre-euro period versus the entire period, one observes a modest decline for the gap 
in the prices for light bulbs and onions. [Again, this need not be true for every product and is 
not true.]  Among the examples in Table 1, the smallest price difference occurs between the two 
cities in the United States, Chicago and Houston.   8
The evidence in Table 1 is suggestive.  Exchange rate stabilization, particularly 
institutionalized stabilization, appears to stimulate goods market integration.  Of course, Table 1 
is anecdotal, since only two products are exhibited out of 95 goods in our sample.  A more 
systematic approach is required, which is what we turn to next. 
 
3.  Statistical Analysis 
Empirical Methodology 
It is tempting to measure goods market integration between two locations by some 
average of price differences across goods.  However, this would not be appropriate.  At least 
since Heckscher (1916), it has been recognized that the existence of positive costs of arbitrage 
imposes two inequality constraints on the prices of an identical good, k, in two different 
locations, i and j.  Intuitively, once the price differential,  t k j t k i t k ij P P Q , , , , , , ln ln − = , goes out of a 
band, arbitrage activity becomes profitable and is likely to take place to bring the price back to 
inside the band.  Within the band however, any realization of the price differential,  t k ij Q , , , is 
possible.   
Heckscher’s insight has been formalized recently by Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Taylor 
(2001), and O’Connell and Wei (2002), among others.  Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) and Taylor 
(2001), model a variable cost of arbitrage.  There are two thresholds that define a band of no 
arbitrage.  If the realized price difference strays outside the threshold, arbitrage activity would 
bring it back to the edge of the band.  O’Connell and Wei (2002) provide a continuous-time 
general equilibrium model that allows for both fixed and variable costs in arbitrage.  The 
prediction of the model can be summarized schematically in Figure 1.  There are four 
thresholds for price differentials: two defining an outer band, c1 and c4; and two others 
defining an inner band, c2 and c3.   If the price difference strays outside the outer threshold,   9
Q< c1, or Q>c4, arbitrage activities would bring it back to the edge of the inner band c2 or c3, 
whichever is closer.  Importantly, inside the outer band, (c1, c4), however, any realized price 
dispersion is consistent with no arbitrage.   
Coming back to our data set, we use the distribution of the observed price differentials 
(i.e., for each of the 95 goods) to estimate the no-arbitrage band (for each city-pair and time 
period).  This would correspond to the outer band in O’Connell and Wei (2002).  For 
simplicity, we do not attempt to measure the inner band.  Our measure of goods market 
integration, then, would be the width of the no-arbitrage zone, which may vary across location 
pairs and time periods.  In particular, any reduction to barriers to arbitrage (i.e., movements 
toward market integration) should reduce the no-arbitrage range.  In addition to considering 
transportation costs and tariffs, we also examine whether exchange rate volatility and currency 
arrangements act as additional barriers to arbitrage. 
  As a start, we gauge the degree of market integration, or the width of the no-arbitrage 
zone by the standard deviation of the empirical distribution of the percentage price dispersion, 
t k ij Q , , , over the 95 products.  We recognize the possibility that the magnitude of the deviation 
from the law-of-one-price may depend on the type of the product.  Hence, prior to calculating 
standard deviation, we remove the good-specific mean of the deviation at time t.  More 
precisely, let 
*
,t k Q  denote the average price dispersion for product k in year t over all city pairs.  
Define  
*
, , , , , t k t k ij t k ij Q Q q − ≡ . (2) 
Our measure of the barriers to arbitrage – or feasible range of deviations from perfect market 
integration – for city-pair ij in year t is the standard deviation of  t k ij q , ,  over all 95 products.  
Note that we do not use the difference between max{ t k ij q , , } and min{ t k ij q , , } as a measure of   10
the feasible range of DLOP as we do not want our measure to be driven by a few outliers.  For 
the purpose of the subsequent analysis, we only need to measure the barriers to arbitrage for a 
particular pair of locations relative to another pair.  Our maintained assumption is that the 
standard deviation measure adopted here is proportional to the true range of no-arbitrage 
across time and across different pairs of locations. 
To ensure that our analysis does not depend on a particular measure of barriers to 
arbitrage, we will also examine two alternative ways to gauge the degree of market integration.  
The first alternative is the inter-quartile range, or the difference between the 75
th and 25
th 
quartiles in the empirical distribution of  t k ij q , ,  over the 95 products for a given city-pair and 
time period.  This metric would further limit the influence of possible outliers.  The second 
alternative is to use the standard deviation of absolute percentage price differences,  t k ij q , , .    
  Table 2 presents some summary data grouped by institutional arrangements.  It is 
obvious that most of the bilateral city-pairs in the sample are not part of an institutional 
exchange rate arrangement – indeed only 4.5% are members.  In columns 2 through 4, the 
average dispersion, distance and exchange rate variability are reported.  Distance is calculated 
using the great circle formula using each city’s latitude and longitude data obtained from the 
United Nation’s web site http://www.un.org/Depts/unsd/demog/ctry.htm.  Exchange rate 
variability is defined as the standard deviation of changes in the monthly bilateral exchange rate 
(between the city-pairs involved) during each year.  In Table 2 we can detect a positive 
correlation between average variability of relative prices and distance.  The correlation with 
exchange rate variability is less obvious since Hard Peg city-pairs – with the second largest 
relative price variability, are on average quite far apart.  
For illustration, Figure 2 presents the time series of the price dispersion averaged over   11
all city-pairs and all products on a year-by-year basis.  The downward trend is apparent in this 
figure.  Of course, we do not yet know what factors influence the price dispersion.  This is 
investigated more systematically below.   
 
Basic Regressions 
  We begin our formal investigation of factors influencing goods market integration by 
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( ) t ij q BDLOP ,  is the Band of Deviations from Law of One Price for city-pair ij in year t.  
For convenience we measure the left hand side variable in percentage terms.  In equation 3, 
HPeg, CFA, US, Euro are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the observation for the 
dependent variable involves cities that are both part of the same institutional arrangement.  The 
language dummy takes the value 1 if the city pair shares a common language (either official or 
primary business language), and zero otherwise.  The data was taken from the CIA World 
Factbook ( http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ indexgeo.html) .   W e  a l s o  a d d  a  
dummy for high-inflation episodes/countries.  The episodes were Argentina (1992), Peru 
(1991), Mexico (1993), Uruguay (1993), Brazil (1993-4), and Poland (1995).  We include both 
the log of the distance between cities i and j, and the log distance squared in the regression to 
account for possible non-linearity in the relationship.  Tariffij is defined (initially) as the sum of 
the two average tariff rates in countries i and j, unless the two cities are both in the same free 
trade area or customs union (such as within the United States, or within the European Union).    12
In these cases the value for tariff is set equal to zero.  Later, we consider two alternative 
definitions of Tariffij for robustness.   
Table 3 presents the benchmark regression results.  According to column 1, dispersion 
of relative prices increases with distance, consistent with the interpretation that distance is a 
proxy for transportation cost, and the effect is concave, i.e., distance increases dispersion, but at 
a declining rate.  Increased exchange rate variability is also associated with increased relative 
price variability.  In particular reducing monthly exchange rate variability from the sample 
average to zero reduces price dispersion by 0.26 percent (=0.067*3.82).  However, participating 
in a hard peg – such as a currency board or adopting another currency reduces price dispersion 
by 3.21 percent – an order of magnitude more than simply reducing exchange rate variability.  
This seems to indicate that a hard peg confers more than simply exchange rate stability.  The 
point estimate on the CFA dummy is positive, however it is not statistically significant.  The 
estimate for the ‘Euro’ dummy also implies a relatively large reduction in price dispersion.  It is 
in fact greater than that on the “Hard Peg” dummy (the 
2 χ statistic from a formal test is 
significant at the 10% level), which suggests that the Euro is already having a noticeable impact.  
According to the estimates in Table 3, sharing a common language (or a common colonial past) 
– and all that that implies – reduces price dispersion significantly.   
The strongest effect (statistically and economically) on price dispersion comes from 
being in the U.S., an effect we attribute to the higher levels of political and economic 
integration within the United States.  The additional reduction in price dispersion associated 
with intra-U.S. cities is about three times larger than simply participating in a hard peg.   
We can also express the economic effects of an institutional stabilization in terms of 
equivalent tariff reduction.  According to the point estimates in the first column of Table 3, the 
effect of the euro on European goods market integration – in excess of reducing exchange rate   13
volatility to zero – is equivalent to reducing the tariff rate in each country by 5 percentage 
points [=4.30/(0.43*2)].  The average external tariff rate of the developed countries is about 4 
percent.  So these estimates suggest that the extra stimulus to goods market integration resulting 
from implementing a common currency (like the euro) is of the same order of magnitude as 
eliminating tariffs among the European countries under its common market program of the 
1990s.  In other words, the economic effect is not trivial. 
As a comparison, for a random pair of countries, reducing exchange rate volatility from 
the world average (0.067) to zero is equivalent to a tariff rate reduction of only 0.3 percentage 
points [3.82*0.067/(0.43*2)].  Finally, the economic and political union of the United States has 
the biggest stimulus on goods market integration.  Belonging to such a union provides a 
reduction in goods price dispersion (in excess of reducing exchange rate volatility to zero) that 
is similar to a reduction in tariffs by 12 percentage points [=10.14/(0.43*2)]. 
In sum, the evidence presented in Table 3 points to four conclusions.  First, reducing 
nominal exchange rate variability reduces relative price variability.  Secondly, an economically 
stronger effect (by an order of magnitude) comes from participating in a hard peg – such as a 
currency union or explicitly abandoning the domestic currency and adopting a foreign currency.  
Thirdly, there is important heterogeneity in terms of the effect of different currency 
arrangements.  In particular, membership in the CFA currency bloc does not confer any extra 
degree of integration in the goods market.  As far as promoting goods trade is concerned, the 
CFA is a currency union in name only.  Finally, the largest effects on integration come through 
political and economic integration.  We next turn to robustness and sensitivity analysis. 
 
Extensions and Robustness Checks 
In this section we begin by considering (a) some additional explanatory variables, and   14
(b) some re-definitions of explanatory variables.  Next we examine (c) different measures of the 
left-hand-side variable, namely, price dispersion.  Finally, we consider (d) alternative 
specifications, including adding city-pair-specific random effects. 
We begin by adding a measure of labor costs.  This data was obtained from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit as well.  The first is the absolute value of the wage difference between 
the cities.  According to Column 2 in Table 3, increasing the absolute percentage difference in 
wage rates between the two cities raises price dispersion.  In order to investigate a possible non-
linear relationship we entered the absolute wage difference squared as well.  In the final column 
of the table we see that wage differences appear to be reflected in price dispersion, though the 
effect is not linear. 
Next we turn to two different alternative definitions of the tariff variable in the 
regression.  In Table 3 the tariff variable is the sum of the two cities trade-weighted average 
tariff rates.  In column 1 of Table 4, we substitute instead the sum of the simple average tariff 
rates.  This change has virtually no effect on the magnitudes or statistical significance of the 
other variables in the equation, and the coefficient on the new tariff definition is only slightly 
smaller than that on the weighted-average tariff.  The coefficient on the CFA dummy remains 
statistically insignificant.  In Columns 2 through 4, tariff is redefined as the maximum of the 
two tariff rates between the two cities.  The same qualitative conclusion applies.  
Next, in column 3 we add the standard deviation of the wage difference – defined as the 
standard deviation of the absolute wage difference over the entire period.  According to the 
parameter estimate, higher variability is associated with greater price dispersion.  In the final 
column, we eliminate extreme observations of the dependent variable and re-estimate.  Note 
that doing this lowers the fit of the equation and the statistical significance of the high-inflation 
dummy disappears.  Apparently, the outliers closely approximate the hign-inflation periods.    15
The size of the “Euro” effect becomes slightly larger than that for the ‘Hard peg’, and the 
impact of exchange rate variability is smaller than before.  However, none of the basic 
conclusions from Table 3 are changed.   
  In Table 5 we investigate the robustness of our results to an alternative definition of the 
left-hand-side variable.  Specifically, we measure the dispersion in prices by the inter-quartile 
range of the percentage price difference between any two cities over the 95 goods, or the 
difference between the 75
th percentile and the 25
th percentile of the distribution of percentage 
price differences.  We proceed as before, sequentially adding variables as we move through the 
columns in the table.  Again, all the previous conclusions hold.  
  In Table 6, a third way to measure price dispersion is adopted – by using the standard 
deviation of the absolute differences in prices in percentage term.  In Table 1 we presented 
some summary statistics on the average size of price differences across various groupings of 
city-pairs.  Since positive and negative differences would tend to cancel each other out, the 
simple average would misrepresent the true extent of price differences.
2  Thus for comparability 
with Table 1, we re-estimate the equations with the standard deviation of absolute percentage 
price differences as the dependent variable.  Once again, our conclusions remain substantively 
unaffected by this re-definition of the dependent variable.  The main exception is that the CFA 
dummy now enters with a negative coefficient, and the effect of tariffs appears somewhat 
smaller than before.  As before, the effects of joining the Euro appear larger than for other 
Hard-pegs, and represent an additional reduction of price dispersion beyond reductions in 
nominal exchange rate variability alone.  Finally, the effect of going still further, i.e., to complete 
political and economic union, remains the largest institutional effect limiting price dispersion.   
                                                 
2 In principle, given that our focus is on the dispersion in prices, the tendency for positive and negative values to 
cancel should not be a concern (since dispersion is measured around the mean).   16
Because exchange rate variability is potentially endogenous, we also implement an 
instrumental variable estimation.  The monetary theory of exchange rate determination indicates 
that the relative money supply (of the two countries in question) is an important determinant of 
their exchange rate.  On the other hand, it seems unlikely that a country would change its 
money supply just to influence the dispersion of its tradable goods prices with another country.  
Therefore, on an ex ante basis, changes in the relative money supply could be a good 
instrument for changes in the exchange rate.  Thus, we instrument the nominal exchange rate 
variability with the contemporaneous and lagged variability in relative money supplies.   
Variability of both exchange rates and money supplies is computed as the standard deviation of 
monthly changes in logs of each variable during the year.   
Table 7 presents these results.  Virtually the only change in this table from the previous 
results is that the coefficients on exchange rate variability have risen.  According to Equation 4, 
(from the regression omitting extreme observations on the dependent variable), reducing 
exchange rate variability from the sample average to zero reduces price dispersion by 0.61 
percent – twice as large as that reported in Table 3.  Even with this larger effect of reducing 
exchange rate variability, all other conclusions – including the relative ranking of effects – 
remain as previously stated.  In another iteration of instrumental variable estimation, we 
included a lagged value of exchange rate variability in the instrument set.  Though we do not 
report these results here to save space, our conclusions are essentially the same as before. 
To consider possible non-linear effects of exchange rate volatility on price dispersion, 
we include the square of exchange rate variability as an additional regressor.  These results are 
reported in Table 8.  The evidence suggests that the effect of exchange rate volatility on price 
dispersion is positive but concave: higher exchange rate volatility is associated with greater price 
dispersion, but the incremental effect gets smaller as volatility increases.  Based on the estimates   17
in this table, the effect of reducing exchange rate volatility from the sample average to zero is 
larger than before, but still much smaller than a hard peg. 
So far, we use city fixed effects and year fixed effects to capture factors that may affect 
the dispersion in prices between cities that are not otherwise in the list of regressors.  In Table 
9, we add city-pair specific random effects to the regressions, in addition to the city and year 
fixed effects.  These results are broadly similar to the previous tables.  The primary exception is 
in the estimate for the Euro.  It is generally much smaller than that for the Hard Peg dummy, 
and the Euro dummy looses its statistical significance in all equations.  However, the coefficient 
on Hard Peg is statistically significant in each of the three specifications.  The U.S. dummy 
remains highly statistically significant and economically dominates the other institutional 
arrangement effects.   
In Table 10, we consider some alternative institutional classifications and controls for 
trade blocs.  Among the Hard Peg arrangements that are studied in the sample, two of the 
country pairs – the Panama-US pair and the Belgium-Luxembourg pair – stand out by their 
long history.  In the first column of Table 11 we replace our Hard Peg dummy with a separate 
dummy for long-term pegs (Panama-US, and Belgium-Luxembourg), and more recent currency 
boards (Hong Kong-US, and Argentina-US).  Both these new dummies are statistically 
significant.  The point estimate on long-term currency unions is roughly twice that for (more 
recent) Currency Boards.  As we include more regressors (in columns 2-3), the estimate of 
reduction in price dispersion attributable to long-term pegs declines a bit (from -7.1 in column 1 
to -5.7 percent in column 3), but the distinction between Long-term pegs and Currency Boards 
remains; the effect of long-term pegs on price dispersion is always above that for more recent 
currency boards.   
We have been focusing on the differential effects of institutional versus instrumental   18
stabilization of exchange rate volatility on the goods market integration.  As an analogy, we can 
also examine whether formation of a trade bloc could have a different effect on goods market 
integration than a mere reduction in tariff rates.  The idea is that a trade bloc implies a greater 
degree of commitment to maintaining low tariff (and non-tariff) barriers to trade on imports 
from member countries, i.e., reductions in tariffs are less likely to be reversed.  To investigate 
this possibility, in column 2 of Table 10 we add controls for all the prominent trade blocs in 
Europe and in the Americas.  These are: the European Union (EU), the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR).   
The coefficients on all of the trade blocs are negative, consistent with the interpretation 
that an institutionalized reduction in trade barriers (through the formation of a trade bloc) 
would promote greater integration in the goods market than merely reducing trade barriers 
through unilateral trade liberalization.  The coefficients on four of the five trade blocs (i.e., 
except CEFTA) are statistically significant.  Other conclusions are similar as before.   
Specifically, a reduction in exchange rate volatility promotes goods market integration in the 
form of a reduction in the range of price dispersion.  A currency board arrangement promotes 
goods market integration to an extent much greater than merely reducing the exchange rate 
volatility to zero.  Long-term currency unions such as the Panama’s adoption of the U.S. dollar 
or the Belgium-Luxembourg currency union offer an even greater stimulus to goods market 
integration than a currency board.  The degree of market integration associated with a long-
term, political and economic union as the United States is the highest of all – i.e., the dispersion 
of prices for identical goods is the smallest.  Time could change this.  In the final column, we 
again eliminate outliers and a statistically significant effect of the Euro reappears, though it is 
much smaller than before.  Also, statistical significance disappears for the Mercosur trade bloc   19
dummy. 
So far, we have not included city-pair fixed effects in the regressions (though city and 
year fixed effects have been included).  This is because many variables of central interest to us, 
such as most of the currency arrangements, have virtually no time variation in our sample.  The 
inclusion of the country-pair fixed effects would impede our ability to estimate these parameters 
of interest.  However, if we restrict our interest to estimating the effect of exchange rate 
volatility, we could potentially include them.  There are altogether 3403 city pairs (=83X82/2) in 
the sample.  In Table 11, we include these city-pair fixed effects together with the year 
dummies.  The coefficient on the exchange rate variable is still positive and statistically 
significant at the one-percent level.  On the other hand, the size of the point estimates (between 
1.3 and 3.4) is somewhat smaller than in the previous tables. 
A surprise in Column 3 is that a greater absolute wage difference is associated with 
lower price dispersion.  However, the estimates for nominal exchange rate variability, high 
inflation episodes, and tariffs are unaffected by these additional wage variables.  In the final 
column, we remove the outliers (the top and bottom 1% of the observations in terms of the 
range of price dispersion) on the dependent variable.  In this specification, the sign on the wage 
variables reverts to that reported in earlier tables.  Overall, Table 11 confirms one of our main 
findings – namely, reducing nominal exchange rate variability lowers price dispersion.  This 
effect is not driven by any omitted, city-pair-specific factor. 
  In the previous regressions, we have used observations on all pairs of cities that our data 
set allows – which means 3403 city pairs in total.  Even though all the regressions include city 
dummies to absorb possible correlation in the residual due to the presence of a particular city, it 
is useful to gauge whether the basic results hold for a subset of city pairs.  Hence, we construct 
a globally dispersed, but reduced, sample selecting one benchmark city per continent, and we   20
omit ‘overlapping’ city pairs.  That is, in this sub-sample, if city pairs 1&2 and 2&3 are included, 
then 1&3 are not included.  Specifically, we select (a) all city pairs vis-à-vis Chicago (U.S.) – 
except for U.S.-euro and U.S.-CFA city pairs, plus (b) all euro city-pairs that involve Paris 
(France), plus (c) all CFA city-pairs that involve Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire), plus (d) all city pairs 
vis-à-vis Tokyo (Japan) – except for Japan-U.S., Japan-euro, Japan-CFA, plus (e) all city pairs 
vis-à-vis Sao Paulo (Brazil) – except for Brazil-U.S., Brazil-euro, Brazil-CFA, and Brazil-Japan.   
  With this reduced sample, we re-estimate several key specifications and report the 
results in Table 12.  As can be seen, the qualitative conclusions from the previous tables remain 
the same here.  In particular, more volatile exchange rates, higher tariffs and longer distance are 
associated with a wider band of price dispersion between countries, while the euro, currency 
boards, and long-term common currencies are associated with large reductions in the width of 
the band of price dispersion.  The effects of these institutionalized currency arrangements on 
goods market integration are an order of magnitude bigger than merely reducing exchange rate 
volatility to zero.  
 
Endogenous Currency Unions 
So far, we have taken currency unions and hard pegs as exogenously given.  Persson 
(2001) and Terenyro (2002) argue that this could be problematic for the question that this paper 
examines.  In this sub-section, we endogenize them and examine the consequences for the 
estimated effect of currency arrangements for goods market integration.  Specifically, we 
estimate a system of two equations.  The main equation links the band of deviations from the 
law of one price (DLOPs) for a given pair of countries to its currency arrangement and other 
determinants of the barriers to trade broadly defined. 
ij ij ij ij e X CU θ BDLOP + + = Γ  (4)   21
  ij CU  is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the ij-pair share a common 
currency or a currency board linking the currencies together.
3   ij X  is a vector of determinants 
of the no-arbitrage band other than the institutional arrangement. 
  Currency unions (and hard pegs) are endogenously determined, depending on the 
realization of a latent variable, 
* CU .   
  ij CU  =  1    if  0
* > ij CU  
  =  0   otherwise  (5) 
  .
*
ij ij ij u δ Y CU + =  
Where  ij Y  is a vector of variables that influence the decision of a country (or pairs of countries) 
to adopt a common currency or currency board.  e and u are iid normal with mean equal to 
zero, variances equal to 
2
e σ  and 
2
u σ , respectively, and with a correlation coefficient equal to ρ .  
This system can be estimated via the method of maximum likelihood. 
  A few remarks are in order before we proceed to the estimation results.  First, we focus 
on the data from one year (2000), as the currency unions and hard pegs do not exhibit much 
variation over time within our sample.  Second, the choice of variables that go into the  ij Y  
vector is guided by the optimal currency areas a la’ Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen 
(1969) and more recent papers on the subject such as Alesina and Barro (2000).  A leading 
candidate in this respect is some measure of the degree of synchronization of the two countries’ 
business cycles, or  ij SBC , for short.  We compute  ij SBC  in two steps.  In Step 1, we collect 
annual data on GDP for all the countries in the sample from 1980 to 1999.  We apply either an 
                                                 
3 Note that we have treated common currencies and currency boards symmetrically, as we do not have a good way 
to endogenize the two separately. 
   22
HP-filter or a Band-Pass filter a la’ Baxter and King (1999) to log GDP so that we can 
concentrate on the portion of the GDP movement that corresponds to what we think should 
be business cycle frequencies.  Define  j fgdp  as the filtered version of log GDP(j) for country j.  
In Step 2, we compute the correlation between the filtered log GDP series of the two countries 
in question.  Hence our “synchronization of business cycles” measure is: 
( ) j i ij fgdp fgdp corr SBC , = . 
  The result, using an HP(10) to filter log GDP in the treatment equation, is reported in 
Table 13.  Column 1 reports the results of an OLS estimation using the 2000 data, which serves 
as a comparison for subsequent columns.  Each of the columns 2-5 represents a variation of the 
basic specification of the two-equation system.  The upper panel reports the results of the main 
equation, which links deviations from the law of one price to a dummy for currency union and 
other regressors.  The lower panel reports the results of the treatment equation,which links 
currency unions to factors such as the synchronization of business cycles and the volume of the 
bilateral trade between the countries.  In Column 2, the treatment equation includes only the 
synchronization of business cycles (SBC) and volume of trade variables.  As can be seen, the 
likelihood of adopting a currency union increases as the two economies have more correlated 
business cycles or as they have a higher volume of goods trade.  In the main equation on goods 
market integration (upper panel), the coefficient on the “currency union” dummy is -10.6 and 
statistically different from zero.  This means that a currency union arrangement continues to be 
associated with a deeper integration in the goods market even when one allows the currency 
union decision to be endogenous.  In fact, the quantitative effect is even bigger than the 
corresponding OLS estimate in Column 1. 
In Column 3, we modify the treatment equation by replacing the volume of goods trade   23
with a set of gravity determinants of bilateral trade.  Specifically, we include: the product of the 
two countries’ GDP; the product of the two countries’ per capita GDP; log distance; a dummy 
(“border”) for two countries sharing a common border; a dummy for common language; a 
common colonizer dummy; and a discrete variable for being landlocked.  The variable 
Landlocked takes a value of ‘2’ if both countries are landlocked, ‘1’ if one of them is, and ‘0’ 
otherwise.  Most of these additional variables have sensible signs.  More importantly, in the 
main regression (upper panel), the coefficient on the currency union dummy is negative and 
statistically significant.  In fact, the point estimate is virtually the same as it was in Column 2, 
where a different specification of the treatment equation was used. 
Because the product of the GDP’s in the treatment equation is insignificant we drop 
this variable and re-estimate the system.  The result is reported in reported in Column 4 of 
Table 13.  The qualitative result stays the same.  In particular, a currency union is found to 
promote integration in the goods market in a statistically significant way.  In the earlier part of 
this section, we showed that the CFA zone appears to be different from other currency union 
arrangements by not being associated with deeper goods market integration.  In Column 5 (the 
last column) of Table 13, we exclude CFA from the definition of the currency union dummy 
and enter it as a separate regressor.  In this specification, the coefficient on the (modified) 
currency union is virtually the same as before and the coefficient on the CFA dummy is 
statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
  So far, the synchronization of business cycles, or SBC, is computed using the correlation 
of two countries’ HP(10) filtered log GDP series.  In Table 14, we apply an HP(100) filter to 
the log GDP series prior to computing the SBC measure.  The HP(100) filter produces a 
smoother long-run trend component in the GDP series.  Therefore, in principle, the resulting 
business cycle components could be different from those used in Table 13.  In fact however,   24
with the newly defined SBC variable, the estimation results in Table 14 are very similar to those 
in Table 13.  In particular, currency unions are found to be associated with a reduction in the 
range of price dispersion by approximately ten percentage points, i.e., an economically 
significant increase in market integration.   
In Table 15, we adopt yet another measure of SBC -- this time a Band-Pass filter (2, 8), 
as advocated by Baxter and King (1999).  According to Baxter and King (1999), the Band-Pass 
filter may produce a filtered GDP series that corresponds more closely to the business cycles 
that macroeconomists have in mind.
4  As it turns out, as can be seen from Table 15, the SBC 
variable in the treatment equation, thus measured, is not statistically significant in any of the 
specifications.  On the other hand, the coefficient on the currency union dummy in the main 
equation, which is central to the research question in this paper, continues to have a negative 
sign and is statistically significant.  This is true for all specifications in Table 15.  In fact, the 
point estimates are in the same ballpark as those in Tables 13 and 14. 
  To summarize, the attempt to endogenize currency boards and common currencies in 
this sub-section has not overturned the basic conclusion of the paper.  Namely, institutional 
currency arrangements are associated with a statistically and economically significant deepening 
of goods market integration. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper empirically examines the effect of exchange rate arrangements on the 
integration of goods markets.  The methodological innovation is to use the distribution of price 
deviations of identical goods rather than the volume of trade as the measure of market 
integration.  We compare observed prices of 95 products for 3403 city-pairs for the eleven-year 
                                                 
4 However, see Murray (2002) for a contrarian view   25
period 1990-2000.  
There are a number of noteworthy findings.  First, we find that goods market 
integration is inversely related to exchange rate variability and tariff barriers.  Second, the impact 
of adopting a hard peg (currency board or currency union) is much larger than merely reducing 
exchange rate volatility to zero.  Third, there is important heterogeneity among the currency 
arrangements that should not be ignored.  In particular, the CFA countries do not have an 
integrated goods market despite sharing a common currency.  On the other hand, long-term 
currency unions have a greater impact than more recent currency boards.  Fourth, relative to 
the U.S. benchmark, all existing currency boards or common currencies such as the euro still 
have further to go to improve the integration of their goods market.  Finally, we have subjected 
our basic results to numerous sensitivity tests and found them fundamentally robust to different 
definitions of the dependent and independent variables, different specifications, the exclusion 
of extreme values, and to different estimation methodologies – including making the decision to 
adopt a currency union endogenous.   
A useful direction for future research is to combine the price-based approach here with 
the trade flow-based approach.   26
 
 
Table 1: Percentage Price Deviations in Absolute Value 
  (averaged over all years)   
 
Asuncion-Taipei 
Light Bulbs  65.4 
Onions 115.0 
 
Paris-Vienna (1990-1998, pre-euro) 








Light Bulbs  8.9 
Onions 42.7 
 





   27
 
 
Table 2: Dispersion and its Determinants: 
Averages across city pairs and time 
  Observations   ( ) ) , ( t ij q V
4 Distance  () ) , ( t ij s V
5 Tarriff
6 
All City Pairs   36531  6.38  8215  0.67  22.3 
Hard Peg City Pairs
1 454  5.76  8602  0.01  9.8 
US Only City Pairs 975  3.78  2681  0.00  0.0 
CFA City Pairs
2 110  6.29  3139  0.27  41.9 
Euro City Pairs
3 110  4.19  1273  0.00  0.0 
Euro City Pairs (pre-Euro) 495  4.37  1273  0.13  0.0 
 
1Hard Peg city-pairs are defined as city-pairs involving price comparisons between two cities 
maintaining a peg to the same currency.  The Hard Peg classification includes three groups of 
bilateral pairs:  (a) pairs that involve Buenos Aires (post 1992), Hong Kong, and Panama City, 
(b) bilateral pairs between those cities in (a) and U.S. cities, and (c) Brussels and Luxembourg.   
 
2CFA city-pairs are defined as city-pairs involving price comparisons between two of the 
following cities: Abidjan, Dakar, Douala, Libreville, and Paris. 
 
3Euro city-pairs are defined as city-pairs involving price comparisons between two of the 
following cities (post 1998): Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, Dublin, Helsinki, Lisbon, 
Luxembourg, Madrid, Paris, Rome, and Vienna. 
 
4This column reports the average across relevant city-pair groupings (and time) of the 
dispersion of  (de-meaned) percentage price differences. 
 
5This column reports the average across relevant city-pair groupings (and time) of the 
variability of (defined as changes in log monthly) bilateral nominal exchange rates. 
 
6Tariff is defined as the sum of the two individual tariff rates in countries i and j, unless the 
two cities are both in the United States, or they are both in the European Union.  In these 
cases the value for tariff is set equal to zero. 
   28
 
 
Table 3: Benchmark Regression Results 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
Log Distance   13.63  14.01  13.17 
  (1.30) (1.32) (1.31) 
Log Distance Squared  -0.67  -0.70  -0.65 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Nominal  Exchange  3.82 3.03 4.59 
Rate  Variability  (0.50) (0.52) (0.50) 
Hard  Peg  -3.21 -2.13 -1.62 
  (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) 
CFA    0.34 0.79 0.63 
  (1.33) (1.33) (1.31) 
U.S. -10.14  -9.53  -9.20 
  (0.31) (0.33) (0.33) 
Euro  -4.30 -3.76 -3.04 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) 
Sum of Weighted Avg. Tariff  0.43  0.38  0.40 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Common  Language  -1.98 -1.48 -1.10 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Absolute Wage    0.48  3.03 
Difference   (0.07)  (0.20) 
Absolute  Wage    -0.23 
Difference  Squared    (0.02) 
 
Year  dummies?  yes yes yes 
City  dummies?  yes yes yes 
Hyperinflation  dummy?  yes yes yes 
Adjusted R
2  .73 .78 .78 
Number of Observations  27199  21675  21675 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All equations include city and time fixed effects.   29
 
Table 4: Alternative Tariff Definitions, and Omitting Extreme Values 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Log Distance   13.98  14.21  14.28  11.67 
  (1.31)  (1.30) (1.30) (0.98) 
Log Distance Squared  -0.71  -0.72  -0.73  -0.56 
  (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Nominal  Exchange 4.45  4.37 4.43 2.52 
Rate  Variability  (0.50)  (0.50) (0.50) (0.29) 
Hard  Peg    -1.80  -2.18 -2.19 -1.97 
  (0.45)  (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) 
CFA    0.98  1.90 2.28 2.01 
  (1.15)  (1.26) (1.26) (1.22) 
U.S.  -9.09  -9.83 -9.58 -7.93 
  (0.34)  (0.32) (0.33) (0.27) 
Euro  -3.23  -3.57 -3.27 -3.75 
  (0.47)  (0.47) (0.47) (0.44) 
Common  Language  -1.23  -1.19 -1.43 -0.86 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.20)    (0.13) 
Absolute  Wage  3.03  2.89 2.82 3.29 
Difference  (0.20)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.12) 
Absolute  Wage  -0.23  -0.22 -0.24 -0.25 
Difference Squared   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Standard Deviation of      1.13  0.64 
Wage Difference      (0.15)  (0.06) 
Sum of Equal Weighted Tariff  0.33 
 (0.01) 
Maximum of the Two Tariffs    0.38  0.38  0.37 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Year  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
City  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
High-inflation  dummy?  yes  yes yes yes 
Adjusted R
2 .78  .78  .78  .61 
  Number of Observations  21675  21654  21654  21189 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All equations include city and time fixed effects.  The 
final column - designated Equation 4 - reports results from estimation with extreme observations 
on the dependent variable (above the 99
th percentile and below the 1
st percentile) dropped.     30
 
Table 5:  Measuring Price Dispersion by the Inter-quartile Range of q 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Log Distance   18.56  16.04  15.80  12.73 
  (2.16)  (2.17) (2.16) (1.55) 
Log Distance Squared  -0.84  -0.71  -0.69  -0.51 
  (0.14)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) 
Nominal  Exchange 4.34  3.85 3.81 4.91 
Rate Variability  (0.80)  (0.74)  (0.743  (0.54) 
Hard  Peg    -5.45  -2.97 -2.89 -2.52 
  (0.86)  (0.86) (0.89) (0.76) 
CFA    3.47  4.26 3.68 3.13 
  (1.91)  (1.91) (1.91) (1.83) 
U.S. -17.43  -16.44 -16.65 -14.28 
  (0.53)  (0.55) (0.56) (0.41) 
Euro  -7.22  -5.73 -6.04 -4.87 
  (0.78)  (0.77) (0.77) (0.72) 
Common  Language  -1.51  -1.41 -1.10 0.04 
 (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.34)    (0.22) 
Sum of the Two Tariffs  0.43  0.38  0.40  0.46 
  (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Absolute  Wage    4.75 4.86 4.96 
Difference    (0.31) (0.30) (0.20) 
Absolute  Wage    -0.33 -0.30 -0.36 
Difference Squared     (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Standard Deviation of      -1.49  0.22 
Wage Difference      (0.30)  (0.11) 
 
Year  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
City  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
High-inflation  dummy?  yes  yes yes yes 
 
Adjusted R
2 .31  .39  .40  .52 
  Number of Observations  27344  21740  21740  21319 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All equations include city and time fixed effects.  The 
final column - designated Equation 4 - reports results from estimation with extreme observations 
on the dependent variable (above the 99
th percentile and below the 1
st percentile) dropped. 
   31
 
Table 6: Measuring Price Dispersion by Standard Deviation of |q| 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Log Distance   11.55  10.91  9.65  7.48 
  (1.34)  (1.25) (1.22) (0.91) 
Log Distance Squared  -0.62  -0.57  -0.50  -0.36 
  (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Nominal  Exchange 6.44  3.58 2.80 1.21 
Rate  Variability  (0.62)  (0.53) (0.49) (0.29) 
Hard  Peg    -4.61  -2.62 -1.85 -1.86 
  (0.47)  (0.38) (0.36) (0.35) 
CFA    -2.38  -1.51 -1.65 -1.89 
  (1.14)  (1.00) (0.95) (0.93) 
U.S.  -6.40  -5.48 -4.92 -3.72 
  (0.30)  (0.30) (0.30) (0.24) 
Euro  -3.72  -4.47 -3.30 -3.48 
  (0.50)  (0.44) (0.42) (0.41) 
Common  Language  -3.68  -2.70 -2.16 -1.71 
 (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.19)    (0.13) 
Weighted Avg. Tariff  0.35  0.27  0.29  0.29 
  (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.01) 
Absolute  Wage    2.76 6.71 7.01 
Difference    (0.19) (0.20) (0.12) 
Absolute  Wage    -0.37 -0.36 -0.37 
Difference Squared     (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Standard Deviation of      0.27  0.09 
Wage Difference      (0.15)  (0.05) 
 
Year  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
City  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
High-inflation dummy?  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adjusted R
2 .67  .77  .78  .61 
  Number of Observations  27199  21675  21675  21218 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All equations include city and time fixed effects.  The final 
column - designated Equation 4 - reports results from estimation with extreme observations on the 
dependent variable (above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile) dropped. 
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Table 7: Instrumental Variable Estimation 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Log  Distance  14.76  14.38 14.54 11.45 
  (1.40)  (1.40) (1.40) (1.01) 
Log Distance Squared  -0.75  -0.73  -0.74  -0.54 
  (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
Nominal Exchange  8.53  10.77  9.53  8.74 
Rate  Variability  (2.00)  (1.82) (1.80) (1.58) 
Hard  Peg  -3.10  -1.79 -1.80 -1.54 
  (0.47)  (0.46) (0.44) (0.43) 
CFA  0.29  0.58 0.91 0.60 
  (1.47)  (1.43) (1.41) (1.38) 
U.S.  -9.98  -9.10 -9.01 -7.03 
  (0.33)  (0.35) (0.35) (0.28) 
Euro  -5.06  -4.19 -4.01 -4.09 
  (0.49)  (0.48) (0.48) (0.43) 
Common  Language  -2.06  -1.27 -1.46 -0.81 
 (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.21)    (0.13) 
Sum of the Two Tariffs  0.44  0.40  0.39  0.39 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Absolute  Wage    2.98 2.95 3.45 
Difference    (0.26) (0.26) (0.14) 
Absolute  Wage    -0.21 -0.22 -0.24 
Difference Squared     (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Standard Deviation of      0.83  0.38 
Wage Difference      (0.16)  (0.06) 
 
Year  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
City  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
High-inflation dummy?  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adjusted R
2 .73  .79  .79  .60 
  Number of Observations  24444  19415  19415  18952 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All equations include city and time fixed effects.  The final 
column - designated Equation 4 - reports results from estimation with extreme observations on the 
dependent variable (above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile) dropped.   33
 
Table 8: Non-linear Effects of Exchange Rate Variability 
 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Log  Distance  13.22  12.73 13.05 10.46 
  (1.30)  (1.30) (1.30) (0.97) 
Log Distance Squared  -0.66  -0.63  -0.65  -0.48 
  (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Nominal  Exchange  19.92  17.38 17.93 8.64 
Rate  Variability  (1.53)  (1.81) (1.76) (0.98) 
Nominal  Exchange  -9.50  -7.49 -7.78 -3.46 
Rate Variability Squared  (0.88)  (0.99)  (0.97)  (0.51) 
Hard  Peg  -2.53  -1.12 -1.15 -1.18 
  (0.46)  (0.45) (0.44) (0.42) 
CFA  0.52  0.80 1.07 0.73 
  (1.34)  (1.31) (1.30) (1.27) 
U.S.  -9.81  -8.98 -8.81 -7.26 
  (0.31)  (0.33) (0.33) (0.27) 
Euro  -3.36  -2.30 -2.06 -2.94 
  (0.49)  (0.48) (0.49) (0.45) 
Common  Language  -1.88  -1.12 -1.20 -0.68 
  (0.19)  (0.18) (0.19) (0.13) 
Sum of the Two Tariffs  0.43  0.40  0.39  0.38 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Absolute  Wage    2.95 2.77 3.36 
Difference    (0.19) (0.20) (0.12) 
Absolute  Wage    -0.22 -0.23 -0.25 
Difference Squared     (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Standard Deviation of      0.81  0.33 
Wage Difference      (0.15)  (0.06) 
 
Year  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
City  dummies?  yes  yes yes yes 
High-inflation dummy?  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adjusted R
2 .73  .78  .78  .61 
  Number of Observations  27199  21675  21675  21201 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All equations include city and time fixed effects.  The final 
column - designated Equation 4 - reports results from estimation with extreme observations on the 
dependent variable (above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile) dropped. 
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Table 9: Adding City-Pair Random Effects 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3   
Log Distance   15.76  17.24  17.13 
 (3.00)  (3.09)  (3.04) 
Log Distance Squared  -0.79  -0.89  -0.89 
 (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
Nominal Exchange  3.30  3.56  3.58 
Rate Variability  (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.40) 
Hard Peg   -3.82  -3.25  -3.26 
 (1.47)  (1.41)  (1.40) 
CFA 1.73  1.47  2.05 
 (3.53)  (3.53)  (3.48) 
U.S. -12.59  -11.90  -11.4 
 (1.05)  (1.06)  (1.04) 
Euro -0.13  -0.41  -0.35 
 (1.19)  (1.07)  (1.07) 
Common Language  -1.80  -1.59  -1.94 
 (0.40)  (0.41)  (0.41) 
Sum of the Two Tariffs  0.24  0.24  0.24 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Absolute Wage    -0.17  -0.18 
Difference   (0.15)  (0.15) 
Absolute Wage    -0.001  -0.01 
Difference Squared     (0.01)  (0.01) 
Standard Deviation of      1.31 
Wage Difference      (0.17) 
 
Year dummies?  yes  yes    yes 
City dummies?  yes  yes    yes 
City-pair random effects?  yes  yes  yes  
High-inflation dummy?  yes  yes  yes 
Adjusted R
2 .81  .86  .86 
  Number of Observations  27199  21675  21675 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All equations include city and time fixed effects.   
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  Table 10: Long-term Currency Unions and Trade Blocs   
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
Log Distance   10.29  10.16  8.40 
 (1.29)  (1.28)  (1.00) 
Log Distance Squared  -0.51  -0.50  -0.37 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Nominal Exchange  3.80  3.71  2.34 
Rate Variability  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.28) 
CFA -0.40  -0.39  -0.28 
 (1.31)  (1.31)  (1.28) 
U.S. -11.48  -11.59 -9.50 
 (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.28) 
Euro -4.25  -0.38  -1.63 
 (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
Common Language  -2.00  -2.10  -1.19 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.13) 
Sum of the Two Tariffs  0.41  0.41  0.40 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (.01) 
Long-Term Currency Union  -6.13  -6.19  -5.70 
 (0.98)  (0.97)  (0.65) 
Currency Board  -3.02  -3.05  -3.18 
 (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.43) 
European Union    -5.85  -4.48 
   (0.38)  (0.29) 
EFTA   -6.73  -5.85 
   (1.45)  (1.34) 
CEFTA   -3.77  -7.02 
   (5.36)  (3.26) 
NAFTA   -4.40  -3.51 
   (0.51)  (0.47) 
Mercosur   -2.09  -1.14 
   (1.26)  (1.10) 
Time and City Dummies?    Yes  Yes  Yes 
High-inflation Dummies?    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  .73 .73 .54 
  Number of Observations  27199  26664  26664 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All equations include city and time fixed effects.  The final 
column - designated Equation 3 - reports results from estimation with extreme observations on the 
dependent variable (above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile) dropped.   36
 
 
Table 11: City-pair Fixed Effects 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Nominal  Exchange 2.51  3.29 3.37 1.28 
Rate  Variability  (0.33)  (0.40) (0.41) (0.20) 
Sum of the Two Tariffs    0.10  0.13  0.10 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Absolute Wage      -1.73  1.56 
Difference     (0.17)  (0.09) 
Absolute Wage      0.11  -0.09 
Difference Squared       (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
Time fixed effects?  yes  yes  yes  yes 
City-pair fixed effects?  yes  yes  yes  yes 
High-inflation dummy?  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Removing extreme values?  no  no  no  yes 
Adjusted R
2 .80  .79  .84  .84 
  Number of Observations  36292  27199  27165  21210 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All equations include city-pair and time fixed effects.  The final 
column - designated Equation 4 - reports results from estimation with extreme observations on the 
dependent variable (above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile) dropped. 
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  Table 12: Sub-Sample with Non-Overlapping City Pairs   
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
Log Distance   -8.09  -8.24  -8.94 
 (4.25)  (4.46)  (4.43) 
Log Distance Squared  0.67  0.70  0.74 
 (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.28) 
Nominal Exchange  2.06  4.04  4.18 
Rate Variability  (1.63)  (1.85)  (1.83) 
CFA 9.73  8.66  4.97 
 (2.81)  (3.12)  (3.24) 
U.S. -11.31  -8.80  -9.67 
 (1.07)  (1.10)  (1.13) 
Euro -1.60  -1.81  -2.53 
 (1.14)  (1.11)  (1.28) 
Long-Term Currency Union  -5.78  -5.13  -5.40 
 (1.57)  (1.22)  (1.22) 
Currency Board  -5.00  -2.99  -4.01 
 (1.33)  (1.37)  (1.39) 
Common Language  -6.92  -4.99  -2.60 
 (0.76)  (0.86)  (1.08) 
Sum of the Two Tariffs   0.32   0.36   0.42 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Absolute Wage    3.25  2.87 
Difference   (0.76)  (0.75) 
Absolute Wage    -0.23  -0.19 
Difference Squared     (0.05)  (0.05) 
Standard Deviation of      -1.37 
Wage Difference      (0.26) 
City Dummies?    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies?    Yes  Yes  Yes 
High-inflation Dummy?    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  .82 .86 .86 
  Number of Observations  1568  1271  1271 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  This table uses a reduced set of country pairs.  Specifically, the 
sample includes (a) all city pairs vis-à-vis Chicago (U.S.) – except for U.S.-euro and U.S.-CFA city pairs, (b) 
all euro city-pairs that involve Paris (France), (c) all CFA city-pairs that involve Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire), (d) 
all city pairs vis-à-vis Tokyo (Japan) – except for Japan-U.S., Japan-euro, Japan-CFA, and (e) all city pairs 
vis-à-vis Sao Paulo (Brazil) – except for Brazil-U.S., Brazil-euro, Brazil-CFA, and Brazil-Japan.    38
 
 
  Table 13: Endogenous Currency Unions 
(System Estimation by Maximum Likelihood) 
 
  Dependent variable: Band of Deviations from Law of One Price 
  OLS  Main Equation on Market Integration 
Currency Union  -3.49 (1.14)  -10.63 (1.42) -10.55 (1.06) -10.59 (1.05)  -10.35 (1.01)
Log Distance   17.81(3.21)  15.59 (3.05) 11.51 (3.24) 11.48 (3.23)  11.88 (3.04)
[Log Distance]2   -0.90 (0.19)  -0.78 (0.18) -0.54 (0.19) -0.54 (0.19)  -0.56 (0.18)
Nom.Exchange 
Rate Volatility 
2.17 (0.49)  2.25 (0.49) 2.23 (0.48) 2.24 (0.48)  2.15 (0.47)
Sum of Tariffs  0.64 (0.19)  0.63 (0.18) 0.49 (0.14) 0.50 (0.14)  0.49 (0.14)
Common Lang.  -1.81 (0.52)  -1.94 (0.52) -1.94 (0.53) -1.94 (0.53)  -2.06 (0.53)
CFA     -1.05  (1.87)
    
    











  1.60 (0.25) 1.42 (0.28) 1.37 (0.28)  1.58 (0.30)
Log Trade    0.46 (0.08)  
Log Real GDP    -0.09 (0.09)   0.03 (0.10)
Log GDP/capita    1.26 (0.19) 1.20 (0.19)  1.90 (0.18)
Log Distance    -0.38 (0.08) -0.39 (0.08)  -0.25 (0.07)
Border    -0.08 (0.27) -0.13 (0.26)  0.003 (0.25)
Common Lang.    -0.11 (0.27) -0.09 (0.26)  -0.39 (0.28)
Com. Colonizer    0.13 (0.31) 1.21 (0.31) 
Landlocked     -0.32 (0.16) -0.26 (0.15)  -0.22 (0.160)
Rho    0.68 (0.08) 0.77 (0.05) 0.77 (0.05)  0.82 (0.04)
Sigma    0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001)  0.06 (0.001)
Wald 
2 χ /p-value  0.79 (R2) 5121/0.00 5566/0.00 5565/0.00 5580/0.00
# Observations  1652  1625 1650 1650  1652
 
Note: In parentheses are robust standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions but 
not reported to save space.  “Synchronization of business cycles” is measured by the correlation of the two 
countries’ HP(10)-filtered log GDP series over 1980-2000.  In the last column, “currency union” indicator 
excludes CFA, which is listed separately.    39
 
 
Table 14: Synchronization of Business Cycles Measured by 
Correlation in log GDP after a HP(100) Filter 
(System Estimation by Maximum Likelihood) 
 
Dependent variable: Band of Deviations from Law of One Price 
  Main Equation on Market Integration 
Currency Union  -10.99 (1.27) -10.49 (0.97) -10.53 (0.97) -10.06 (0.94) 
Log Distance   14.64 (2.98) 11.36 (3.14) 11.34 (3.13) 11.48 (2.95) 
[Log Distance]2   -0.72 (0.18) -0.53 (0.19) -0.53 (0.19) -0.54 (0.18) 
Nom.Exchange 
Rate Volatility 
2.31 (0.48) 2.30 (0.48) 2.31 (0.48) 2.23 (0.48) 
Sum of Tariffs  0.62 (0.17) 0.50 (0.14) 0.51 (0.14) 0.52 (0.15) 
Common Lang.  -1.90 (0.52) -1.91 (0.53) -1.92 (0.53) -2.07 (0.53) 
CFA -1.03  (1.85) 
   
   
  Treatment Equation on Hard Pegs and Currency Unions 










1.58 (0.23) 1.39 (0.24) 1.36 (0.24) 1.69 (0.26) 
Log Trade  0.47 (0.08)  
Log Real GDP  -0.10 (0.09) 0.04 (0.10) 
Log GDP/capita  1.32 (0.21) 1.25 (0.20) 2.07 (0.20) 
Log Distance  -0.35 (0.08) -0.36 (0.08) -0.20 (0.07) 
Border  -0.11 (0.26) -0.16 (0.26) -0.04 (0.24) 
Common Lang.  -0.10 (0.28) -0.08 (0.28) -0.46 (0.32) 
Com. Colonizer  1.21 (0.32) 1.29 (0.32)  
Landlocked   -0.35 (0.16) -0.29 (0.14) -0.22 (0.18) 
Rho  0.72 (0.06) 0.78 (0.04) 0.79 (0.04) 0.85 (0.03) 
Sigma  0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 
Wald 
2 χ /p-value  5351/0.00 5556/0.00 5565/0.00 5592/0.00 
# Observations  1625 1650 1650 1652 
 
Note: In parentheses are robust standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions but 
not reported to save space. “Synchronization of business cycles” is measured by the correlation of the two 
countries’ HP(100)-filtered log GDP series over 1980-2000.  In the last column, “currency union” indicator 
excludes CFA, which is listed separately.   40
 
 
Table 15: Synchronization of Business Cycles Measured by 
Correlation in log GDP after a Band-Pass (2, 8) Filter 
(System Estimation by Maximum Likelihood) 
 
Dependent variable: Band of Deviations from Law of One Price 
  Main Equation on Market Integration 
Currency Union  -12.15 (1.62) -11.42 (1.06) -11.41 (1.05) -11.51 (1.07) 
Log Distance   14.42 (3.19) 10.37 (3.20) 10.39 (3.20) 10.75 (3.02) 
[Log Distance]2   -0.71 (0.19) -0.48 (0.19) -0.48 (0.20) -0.50 (0.18) 
Nom.Exchange 
Rate Volatility 
2.30 (0.49) 2.21 (0.47) 2.20 (0.47) 2.14 (0.47) 
Sum of Tariffs  0.65 (0.18) 0.47 (0.13) 0.47 (0.13) 0.44 (0.13) 
Common Lang.  -1.86 (0.52) -1.89 (0.53) -1.88 (0.54) -2.01 (0.53) 
CFA -1.29  (1.82) 
   
   
  Treatment Equation on Hard Pegs and Currency Unions 










0.16 (0.17) -0.02 (0.18) -0.02 (0.18) -0.06 (0.20) 
Log Trade  0.60 (0.08)  
Log Real GDP  0.02 (0.08) 0.14 (0.10) 
Log GDP/capita  1.25 (0.18) 1.26 (0.18) 1.73 (0.16) 
Log Distance  -0.50 (0.07) -0.50 (0.08) -0.42 (0.07) 
Border  -0.21 (0.25) -0.20 (0.25) -0.10 (0.24) 
Common Lang.  0.03 (0.21) 0.03 (0.21) -0.30 (0.23) 
Com. Colonizer  1.11 (0.27) 1.09 (0.27)  
Landlocked   -0.46 (0.15) -0.48 (0.15) -0.39 (0.16) 
Rho  0.74 (0.08) 0.78 (0.05) 0.78 (0.05) 0.83 (0.04) 
Sigma  0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 
Wald 
2 χ /p-value  5179/0.00 5547/0.00 5553/0.00 5547/0.00 
# Observations  1625 1650 1650 1652 
 
Note: In parentheses are robust standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions but 
not reported to save space. “Synchronization of business cycles” is measured by the correlation of the two 
countries’ Band-Pass (2,8)-filtered log GDP series over 1980-2000.  In the last column, “currency union” 




Appendix Table 1: Prices Studied
1.  Apples (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
2.  Aspirin (100 tablets) (supermarket) 
3.  Bacon (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
4.  Bananas (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
5.  Batteries (two, size D/LR20) (supermarket) 
6.  Beef: filet mignon (1 kg) (supermarket) 
7.  Beef: ground or minced (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
8.  Beef: roast (1 kg) (supermarket) 
9.  Beef: steak, entrecote (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
10.  Beef: stewing, shoulder (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
11.  Beer, local brand (1 l) (supermarket) 
12.  Beer, top quality (330 ml) (supermarket) 
13.  Butter, 500 g (supermarket) 
14.  Carrots (1 kg) (supermarket) 
15.  Cheese, imported (500 g) (supermarket) 
16.  Chicken: fresh (1 kg) (supermarket) 
17.  Chicken: frozen (1 kg) (supermarket) 
18.  Cigarette, local brand (pack of 20) (supermarket) 
19.  Cigarettes, Marlboro (pack of 20) (supermarket) 
20.  Coca-Cola (1 l) (supermarket) 
21.  Cocoa (250 g) (supermarket) 
22.  Cognac, French VSOP  (700 ml) (supermarket) 
23.  Cornflakes (375 g) (supermarket) 
24.  Dishwashing liquid (750 ml) (supermarket) 
25.  Drinking chocolate (500 g) (supermarket) 
26.  Eggs (12)  (supermarket) 
27.  Facial tissues (box of 100) (supermarket) 
28.  Flour, white (1 kg) (supermarket) 
29.  Fresh fish (1 kg) (supermarket) 
30.  Frozen fish fingers (1 kg) (supermarket) 
31.  Gin, Gilbey's or equivalent (700 ml) (supermarket) 
32.  Ground coffee (500 g) (supermarket) 
33.  Ham: whole (1 kg) (supermarket) 
34.  Hand lotion (125 ml) (supermarket) 
35.  Insect-killer spray (330 g) (supermarket) 
36.  Instant coffee (125 g) (supermarket) 
37.  Lamb: chops (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
38.  Lamb: leg (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
39.  Lamb: Stewing (1 kg) (supermarket) 
40.  Laundry detergent (3 l) (supermarket) 
41.  Lemons (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
42.  Lettuce (one)  (supermarket) 
43.  Light bulbs (two, 60 watts) (supermarket) 
44.  Lipstick (deluxe type) (supermarket) 
45.  Liqueur, Cointreau (700 ml) (supermarket) 
46.  Milk, pasteurised (1 l)  (supermarket) 
47.  Mineral water (1 l)  (supermarket) 
48.  Olive oil (1 l)  (supermarket) 
49.  Onions (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
50.  Orange juice (1 l)  (supermarket) 
51.  Oranges (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
52.  Peaches, canned (500 g)  (supermarket) 
53.  Peanut or corn oil (1 l)  (supermarket) 
54.  Peas, canned (250 g)  (supermarket) 
55.  Pork: chops (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
56.  Pork: loin (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
57.  Potatoes (2 kg)  (supermarket) 
58.  Razor blades (five pieces) (supermarket) 
59.  Scotch whisky, 6 years old (700 ml) (supermarket) 
60.  Sliced pineapples, canned (500 g)  (supermarket) 
61.  Soap (100 g) (supermarket) 
62.  Spaghetti (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
63.  Sugar, white (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
64.  Tea bags (25 bags)  (supermarket) 
65.  Toilet tissue (two rolls) (supermarket) 
66.  Tomatoes (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
67.  Tomatoes, canned (250 g)  (supermarket) 
68.  Tonic water (200 ml)  (supermarket) 
69.  Toothpaste with fluoride (120 g) (supermarket) 
70.  Vermouth, Martini & Rossi (1 l) (supermarket) 
71.  White bread, 1 kg (supermarket) 
72.  White rice, 1 kg (supermarket) 
73.  Wine, common table (1 l) (supermarket) 
74.  Wine, fine quality (700 ml)  (supermarket) 
75.  Wine, superior quality (700 ml)  (supermarket) 
76.  Yoghurt, natural (150 g)  (supermarket) 
77.  Boy's dress trousers  (chain store)  
78.  Boy's jacket, smart  (chain store)  
79.  Business shirt, white (chain store)  
80.  Business suit, two piece, medium weight (chain store)  
81.  Child's jeans (chain store)  
82.  Child's shoes, dress wear (chain store)  
83.  Child's shoes, sportswear  (chain store)  
84.  Cost of six tennis balls e.g., Dunlop, Wilson (average)  
85.  Dress, ready to wear, daytime (chain store)  
86.  Fast food snack: hamburger, fries and drink (average)  
87.  Frying pan (Teflon or good equivalent) (supermarket)  
88.  International foreign daily newspaper (average)  
89.  Kodak colour film (36 exposures) (average)  
90.  Men’s raincoat, Burberry type (chain store)  
91.  Men's shoes, business wear (chain store)  
92.  Socks, wool mixture (chain store)  
93.  Tights, panty hose  (chain store)  
94.  Women's cardigan sweater (chain store)  






Appendix Table 2: Cities Included 
1   Abidjan  Cote  d’Ivoire 
2   Abu  Dhabi  UAE 
3   Amman  Jordan 
4   Amsterdam  Netherlands 
5   Asuncion  Paraguay 
6   Athens  Greece 
7   Atlanta  United  States 
8   Auckland  New  Zealand 
9   Bahrain  Bahrain 
10   Bangkok  Thailand 
11   Beijing  China,P.R. 
12   Berlin  Germany 
13   Bogota  Colombia 
14   Boston  United States 
15   Brussels  Belgium 
16   Budapest  Hungary 
17   Buenos Aires  Argentina 
18   Cairo  Egypt 
19   Caracas  Venezuela 
20   Casablanca  Morocco 
21   Chicago United  States 
22   Cleveland  United States 
23   Colombo  Sri Lanka 
24   Copenhagen  Denmark 
25   Dakar  Senegal 
26   Detroit  United States 
27   Douala  Cameroon 
28   Dublin  Ireland 
29   Guatemala City  Guatemala 
30   Helsinki  Finland 
31   Hong Kong  Hong Kong 
32   Honolulu  United States 
33   Houston  United States 
34   Istanbul  Turkey 
35   Jakarta  Indonesia 
36   Johannesburg  South Africa 
37   Karachi  Pakistan 
38   Kuala Lumpur  Malaysia 
39   Kuwait  Kuwait 
40   Lagos  Nigeria 
41   Libreville  Gabon 
42   Lima  Peru 
43   Lisbon  Portugal 
44   London  United Kingdom 
45   Los Angeles  United States 
46   Luxembourg  Luxembourg 
47   Madrid  Spain 
48   Manila  Philippines 
49   Mexico City  Mexico 
50   Miami  United States 
51   Montevideo  Uruguay 
52   Moscow  Russia 
53   Mumbai  India 
54   Nairobi  Kenya 
55   New York  United States 
56   Oslo  Norway 
57   Panama City  Panama 
58   Paris  France 
59   Pittsburgh  United States 
60   Port Moresby  Papua New Guinea 
61   Prague  Czech Republic 
62   Quito  Ecuador 
63   Riyadh  Saudi Arabia 
64   Rome  Italy 
65   San Francisco  United States 
66   San Jose  Costa Rica 
67   Santiago  Chile 
68   Sao Paulo  Brazil 
69   Seattle  United States 
70   Seoul  South Korea 
71   Singapore  Singapore 
72   Stockholm  Sweden 
73   Sydney  Australia 
74   Taipei  Taiwan 
75   Tehran  Iran 
76   Tel Aviv  Israel 
77   Tokyo  Japan 
78   Toronto  Canada 
79   Tunis  Tunisia 
80   Vienna  Austria 
81   Warsaw  Poland 
82   Washington DC  United States 
83   Zurich  Switzerland 
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Figure 1: Schematic Summary of the O’Connell-Wei (2002) Model 
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